



*St. Louis Red Cross Motor Corps on duty during influenza epidemic (1918).  
Library of Congress*

**Gouverner en temps de pandémie: la grippe espagnole (1918-20)**

**Besturen in tijden van pandemie: De Spaanse Griep (1918-20)**

Prof. Isabelle Devos (UGent)

Prof. Sophie Vanwambeke (UCL)

20 avril 2021


# 1. The Spanish flu in Belgium

Isabelle Devos  
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Universiteit Gent



Source: Royal Library Belgium, Postcard 1918

# Context



- Mortality decline
- World War I
- Epidemiological transition (from infectious to degenerative diseases)

Crude death rate (deaths per 1000 inhabitants) in Belgium, 1804-2020

# What do we know?

- World War I: Sophie De Schaepdrijver '*De Grootte Oorlog*', Pieter Serrien '*Het Elfde Uur*', etc.
- MA theses on Spanish flu: Benjamin Brulard UCL 2018 (epidemiology and perception), Laurence Hendrickx UAntwerpen 2017 (press), Saartje De Smet UGent 2008 (parish registers)
- Local studies on Spanish flu: Ostend (François & Mahieu 2020), Zwin region (De Meester & Huys 2019), etc.
- International studies: few references on Belgium

→ Limited knowledge



# Why?

## Quantative and quantifiable sources on mortality


### Aggregate municipal level

- Mouvement de l'Etat Civil et de la Population (ARA): only partial data for 1918, better data for 1919

The table is a large grid with many columns and rows. The title is 'Cadre supplémentaire. — Causes des décès en 1919'. It appears to be a summary of mortality data for the year 1919, categorized by cause of death and possibly by municipality or region. The columns include various numerical counts and percentages.

### Individual municipal level

- Death certificates (ARA): embargo 100 years (only recently changed to 50 years)
- Parish registers (mostly locally preserved ; thesis De Smet)
- Cause-of-death registers (mostly local archives): only a handful preserved (medical privacy)
- Hospital patient records (few preserved)



## Qualitative sources:

### Medical reports

- Académie Royale de Médecine de Belgique: no bulletin
- Army: Archives médicales belges (Nolf et al. 1919)

### Governmental measures

- Minutes of ministerial council: -
- Reports of proceedings of the chamber of deputies: -
- Reports of prov. and local council (Gemeentebleden): incomplete for many municipalities in 1918

### Perception

- Newspapers (thesis Hendrickx)
- War diaries (thesis Brulard)

- Incomplete sources

- War time

- Practical issues (< 100 y.)

# How many died?



Source: De Standaard, 20 april 2020.

## Estimates

- De Standaard: 285.165 deaths
- Contemporary estimates: 20.000 deaths

→ Murray et al. (*The Lancet*, 2006):

0,83% excess deaths per 100 people (ca. 62.000 deaths)


→ Reasonable estimation: **30.000-80.000 deaths** (pop. of 7,4 million)

Based on figures for excess mortality compared to 1910-13





& taking into account quality of registration







# When?








**Three waves: spring 1918; oct-nov. 1918; early 1919**




Mutation of virus; army troops and liberation

# Where?




**Crude Death Rate (‰), 1918**  
**All causes**

# Where?




**Crude Death Rate (%), 1918**  
**All causes**



**Crude Death Rate (%), 1919**  
**All causes**

# Where?




**% Deaths by influenza, 1919**

# Age and gender

## International studies

- From U to W: young adults
  - no immunity (flu 1889-90)
  - overreaction of immune system ('cytokine storm')
  - co-morbidity (tuberculosis)
- Gender: mixed results



Age-specific death rates (per 100,000) due to influenza and tuberculosis, U.S. (Taubenberger and Morens, 2006)



# Social class

- Early studies (Crosby 1976, Rice et al. 1988, Tomkins 1992): no social gradient
- Recent studies (Mc Cracken et al. 2003, Herring et al. 2012, Mamelund 2018): occupation, literacy, home ownership, crowding, etc.

first wave hits the poor, the second wave the rich

→ S.O.S. Antwerpen: crowdsourcing unique cause-of-death register (age, occupation, civil status, place of birth, residence)



# Citizen Science: www.sosantwerpen.be

VeleHanden > S.O.S. Antwerpen

velehanden.nl/invoeren/indexeren/project/ugt\_index\_sosantwerpen

S.O.S. Antwerpen (1820-1946) Mijn profiel: Isabelle Devos | Uitloggen

MA\_76114\_0132, S.O.S. Antwerpen - jaar 1880

Speciale tekens  Helpteksten  Scan meebewegen  Andere schermindeling

VOLGNUMM.	DER VERKLARING.	VOORNAMEN.	NAMEN.	BEROEP.	STAND.	OVERLIETEN	BLANCO	BLANCO
5081	7 December 1880	Joannes Josephus Antonius	Muller	Waarwaarder by de directie belastingen	inget.	5 Dec.	27	7
5082	"	Juliana	De Vos	"	echt.	4 "	57	8 22
5083	"	Carolus Josephus	Bloem	"	"	3 "	"	11
5084	"	Franciscus Carolus	Bogaert	"	"	6 "	"	26
5085	"	manneljk kind	Van der Stegen	"	"	6 "	"	"
5086	"	manneljk kind	Gastenaere	"	"	19 "	"	"

Volgnummer\* Datum registratie\* Voornamen\* Familienaam\* Beroep\*

**Letterlijk overnemen. Onvolledige registratienummers worden later automatisch aangevuld** id in jaren\* Leeftijd in maanden\* Leeftijd in dagen\*

Doodsoorzaak\* Volgnummer ziekte\* Geboortjaar\* Geslacht Aanmerkingen

Toelichting

Afronden Te moeilijk Onbruikbaar Opmerkelijk Tussentijds bewaren

Uitgebreide invoerinstructione (pdf) Toelichting

This week: entering data of 1918!



# Measures

- Limited medical knowledge: quinine, formal, syrups, aspirine

→1930s: °virus

→1940s: ° vaccine

- Measures

- No 'national' policy
- Army: isolation of patients; food, drink and clothing
- Local measures: mixed (no measures – recommendations - actions)

Few sources: reports of local councils, newspapers



Source: Gazet van Antwerpen



DE SPAANSHE GRIEP.

De Spaansche ziekte is nu ook in Belgie voorgekomen. In verschillende plaatsen heeft zij haar slachtoffers gevonden, wier aantal dagelijks toeneemt. Ook te Brussel heeft zich de geheimzinnige ziekte geopenbaart. Daarop is door de overheid voorzichtigheidshalve bevel gegeven twee scholen te sluiten.

Voor al het Zuiden des lands, Charleroi, Bergen en Namen wordt ernstig geteisterd. Verscheidene fabrieken hebben wegens tijdelijk gebrek aan arbeiders het bedrijf moeten stilleggen.

De Belgische Standaard, 7 Aug. 1918

CONVOCATION.

Une **épidémie**. — Bon nombre de nos concitoyens, qui étaient occupés à Namur, sont rentrés à Liège, à la suite de la fermeture de tous les établissements publics, théâtres, music-halls, etc. Cette mesure a été prise relativement à **l'épidémie** de dysenterie infectieuse qui aurait fait de nombreuses victimes.

Le Peuple Wallon, 4 sept. 1918

## First wave

'Mysterious disease', German disease, Chinese disease, Spanish flu etc.

Some cities: closing schools, theatres, cafés, etc.

22 AN 117

Geneeskundige Commissie van Brugge.

# VOORZORGSMAATREGELEN

aanbevolen om de verspreiding der aansteekelijke **GRIEP**, genaamd « **SPAANSCH GRIEP** » onder de bevolking te beletten.

1. Geene ongesteldheid, hoe klein ook veronachtzamen; in afwachting der aankomst van den bijgeroepen geneesheer zich te bed leggen;
2. De zieken en voornamelijk deze aangedaan van longverwickelingen in eene **bijzondere** kamer afzonderen;
3. Zich onthouden van longzieken en personen welke bijna genezen zijn (herstellenden) te bezoeken;
4. Zich zoo goed mogelijk voeden;
5. Zich beschutten tegen koude, bijzonder aan **hals en voeten**;
6. De woonplaatsen en bovenal de slaapkamers in de grootste reinheid houden: deze kamers verluchten en vrijhouden van vochtigheid;
7. Zorgvuldig waken op de reinheid zijns lichaams en zijner kleederen;
8. Dagelijks verscheidene malen **gorgelen** met **gebicarbonateerd water**;
9. Meermaals daags **waterdampen** met « **menthol** » of « **Gomenol** » inademen;
10. Alle vergaderingen en samenscholingen vermijden;
11. Na de genezing de ziekenkamers reinigen en ze doen ontsmetten in geval dat de ziekte vergezeld was door longen ontsteking of andere verwickelingen;
12. **Alle scholen** der stad, van de hoogste tot de laagste, voor een onbepaalden tijd doen **schorsen**.

Brugge, den 4 November 1918  
De Secretaris,

Ed. Gillemans.



De Schepen-Voorzitter,

L. DE SCHEPPER.

Brugge, drukkerij G. BARRIAUX-DE CHESELLE, Waalschestraat, 22.

Second wave

Isolation of patients

Food, drink, clothing

Ventilation of rooms

Desinfecting

Avoid gathering and meetings

Closing of schools

Communiqué de la commission médicale  
Mesures à prendre

1. Dès les premiers symptômes du mal, se mettre au lit, dans une chambre très propre, bien aérée, bien chauffée, mais sans excès.  
2. Appeler aussitôt un médecin et se conformer minutieusement à toutes ses indications. Ne pas quitter le lit et la chambre sans son autorisation expresse.

3. Autant que possible, isoler chaque malade.

4. Empêcher la contagion et la propagation, en détruisant journellement sur places les germes contenus dans les crachats, mucosités du nez, de la bouche et des bronches, et dans tout ce qui aurait pu être souillé par le malade.

Le médecin donnera des indications pour cette désinfection. On emploie sur le lit de chaux. Dans un seau de bois ou de métal, on réduit en petits morceaux un litre de chaux grasse, vive et de bonne qualité; on l'arrose lentement de trois litres d'eau; on remue jusqu'à production d'un lait épais; on l'agite au moment de l'usage. On emploie aussi à la même fin le formol. On tient sur ce point aux préférences du médecin.

Pour désinfecter ce qui aura été contaminé au cours de la maladie, on recourt à l'ébullition ou à l'incinération.

5. Pour se prémunir personnellement contre la contagion, éviter tout excès de quelques nature qu'il soit et observer les lois d'une hygiène parfaite. Grande propreté des mains notamment et de la bouche. Ne pas séjourner sans nécessité avec les malades et ne rien consommer dans leur chambre.

Il y a lieu de mettre la population en garde contre la panique. Bien spécifier qu'en prenant les précautions ci-dessus, il est aisé d'éviter la contagion ou bien d'empêcher le malade d'atteindre un degré de gravité.

L'Ami de l'ordre (Namur),  
25 aug. 1918





Chicago News, 1918

San Francisco, 1918



Source: Markel et al., 2007

**Table 2.** Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Implemented in 43 US Cities Between September 8, 1918, and February 22, 1919

Type of Nonpharmaceutical Intervention	No. (%) of Cities Implementing Nonpharmaceutical Intervention for $\geq 1$ wk (N = 43) <sup>a</sup>	Median (Range) Duration of Nonpharmaceutical Intervention, wk
Isolation or quarantine only	15 (35)	1 (1-10)
School closure only	22 (51)	1 (1-7)
Public gathering ban only	6 (14)	1.5 (1-5)
Isolation and quarantine and school closure	2 (5)	5.5 (4-7)
Isolation and quarantine and public gathering ban	4 (9)	4 (2-5)
School closure and public gathering ban	34 (79)	4 (1-10)
Isolation and quarantine, school closure, and public gathering ban	15 (35)	4 (2-6)

# The end?

- Range of measures taken at local level, but no coherent policy
- End World War I: less army troops
- (Herd) immunity?
- Mutation of virus: less virulent?



Source: Royal Library Belgium, Postcard 1918

# Where do we go from here?

Brain-belspo interdisciplinary project  
'Epidemics and Inequalities in Belgium from  
the Plague to Covid-19'

(UA, UGent & UCL) [www.epibel.be](http://www.epibel.be)

- Chronology of excess mortality by week and day for 1918 and early 1919 for different Belgium cities
- Geography of Spanish flu in 1919, including tuberculosis (co-morbidity)
- Profile of victims (S.O.S. Antwerpen!)
- Local policy: systematic analysis of measures mentioned in reports of local councils, newspapers (in relation to excess mortality)





**Gouverner en temps de pandémie: la grippe espagnole (1918-20)**

**Besturen in tijden van pandemie: De Spaanse Griep (1918-20)**

Sophie Vanwambeke

20 avril 2021




# Outline

- Influenza viruses, the 1918-1919 virus, and epidemiology of respiratory diseases
- Spatial diffusion and control at various scales
  - Global trends
  - Heterogeneity in trends: Australia and island epidemiology
  - Multiple seeds and spatial contagion in the UK
  - Spatial dynamics in Belgium
- What for Belgium



# Influenza viruses: « an unchanging disease due to a changing virus »\*



*Adapted from Van-Tam and Sellwood, 2010*

! Viruses were not identified at the time

\* *Stuart-Harris and Schild, 1976, quoted by Smallman-Raynor and Cliff, 2012*

# The « Spanish » influenza virus and its hypothesized origin

## 3 hypotheses for origin:

- Camp Funston/Haskell, Kansas, USA: epidemics identified in the US as early as March 1918 (seasonal flu?)
- Etaples, France: cases of severe respiratory disease of unidentified origin (e.g. « purulent bronchitis ») since 1916-1917
- China


→ *Further understanding of the virus' evolution will not elucidate its spatial origin and path*

→ *Very fast global diffusion, likely through multiple seeds, June-Septembre 1918*




# Diffusion of (respiratory) infectious diseases: In the population

« Classic » SIR model: homogenous mixing of population





# Diffusion of (respiratory) infectious diseases: In the population

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
# Diffusion of (respiratory) infectious diseases: In space



*Adapted from Smallman-Raynor and Cliff, 2012*






# Spatial diffusion in India



Chandra and Kassen-Noor, 2014 and annotations

# Diffusion of (respiratory) infectious diseases: In space

Ratio between Susceptibles and  $c/b$  shapes the wave




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


# Diffusion and travel


**Contagion:** local diffusion



**Hierarchical diffusion:** regional scale




**Relocation:** broad scale diffusion




# Global overview

Wave I



Camp  
Funston (KS)  
origin?


Wave II




*Smallman-Raynor and  
Cliff, 2004, adapted  
from Patterson and  
Pyle, 1991*

# Spatial and temporal heterogeneity

→ Disaggregated analysis can reveal strong heterogeneity, as illustrated for deaths in the navies of different armies



# Heterogeneity in trends: Australia and island epidemiology



*Smallman-Raynor and Cliff 2013*



# Counter measures against long-range relocation

Australia: established quarantine for incoming boats from October 1918

79 ships recorded cases; no one allowed to leave ship until cleared.

Value	Vessels (number)	Susceptibles (crew and passengers)	Average susceptibles per vessel
Total	228	73,482	322
Uninfected	149	15,016	101
Infected <sup>1</sup>	79	57,741	731 <sup>2</sup>
Influenza cases		2,795	
Influenza deaths		99	

Notes: <sup>1</sup> Quarantined. <sup>2</sup> Including troopships.

# Counter-measures against regional, hierarchical diffusion




Figure 8.2 Hospital admissions and deaths from influenza, Sydney, 1919.




Figure 3: Map showing different Pacific states and islands described in the text as being affected by the 1918–21 influenza pandemic.




Figure 5: Estimated numbers of influenza-related deaths in New Zealand and Australia during the 1918–19 influenza pandemic by main island in New Zealand and state in Australia<sup>17,21,22,38,39</sup>

McCracken and Curson, 2003; Shanks et al., 2018

# Counter-measures against local diffusion

Feb 3rd: School and other closures, masks, shops open

Late March/early April: Restrictions again

All restrictions lifted




Figure 8.2 Hospital admissions and deaths from influenza, Sydney, 1919.



## To the People of New South Wales

A danger greater than war faces the State of New South Wales and threatens the lives of all. Each day the progress of the battle is published in the Press. Watch out for it. Follow the advice given and the fight can be won.

Already the efforts made by the Government have had the effect of keeping the New South Wales figures down. But everybody is not yet working, so from TO-DAY on the Government insists that the many shall not be placed in danger for the few and that

### EVERYONE SHALL WEAR A MASK

Those who are not doing so are not showing their independence—they are only showing their indifference for the lives of others—for the lives of the women and the helpless little children who cannot help themselves.

#### CABINET DECISIONS:

At a special meeting of the Cabinet, held yesterday, the following recommendations of the Executive Council (Health) Decisions were adopted:

1. Long-Distance Trains.—No need to prohibit railway travel in New South Wales as yet, although it may be necessary to do so at any moment.
2. Hotel Bars, Restaurants, Tea Rooms.—Not to be closed at the present time, but the sanitary regulations to apply to them.
3. Retail Shops.—Issue regulations to require display of signs and clearing cases, and a recommendation that notices be employed.
4. Church Schools.—Prohibition of all sales in rooms.
5. Libraries.—Reading rooms to be closed down.
6. Billiard Rooms.—To be closed.
7. Race Meetings.—Prohibited.
8. Theatres, Music Halls, Public Entertainment.—Prohibited.
9. Beaches.—The restriction to be placed upon the free use of the beaches on the ground that the risk of infection is likely to be more than counterbalanced by the benefits of the sun.
10. Open Air Meetings in the Parks and Other Places.—Prohibited.
11. Churches and Schools Outside the City of Cumberland.—Not to be closed. Local authorities are to act on their own initiative, but to be aided in case the Public Health Department is overworked.

#### GENERAL RECOMMENDATION.

This, as far as possible, the people be encouraged during the course of the epidemic to take all possible advantage of fresh air as a means of increasing the natural resistance to infection, and of securing the most effective, and also to avoid crowds.

W. A. HOLMAN, Premier.


Figure 8.3 Proclamation of N.S.W. Government regulations to counter epidemic.

Source: *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 February 1919. Reproduced here from *The Sydney Morning Herald*.



McCracken and Curson, 2003

# Local diffusion: seeds vs. geography



Possible seeds

Standardised mortality ratio correlated to:


- Crowded housing
- Type of employment

Males more affected – but not everywhere

Figure 8.5 Age–sex standardised influenza mortality ratios, Sydney, 1919.




# Multiple seeds and spatial diffusion



**Figure 5.9** The spread of influenza in London and the county boroughs of England and Wales, June 1918–April 1919. (A) Wave I, June–August 1918. (B) Wave II, October 1918–January 1919. (C) Wave III, February–April 1919. Geographical units are represented by circles shaded brown according to the week of the corresponding wave in which the first influenza deaths were recorded. Boroughs in which influenza deaths were reported in the week immediately preceding the onset of a given wave are defined as seed locations and are plotted as orange circles. Linear trend surfaces for the expected time to death are shown; numbers attached to the trend surfaces are in weeks. The vectors indicate the general direction of spread of each wave.

# Spatial structure as a clue to diffusion processes

## C. Mixed contagious-hierarchical



Smallman-Raynor et al., 2002

# Diffusion and control

- Multiple diffusion processes often combine, although they correspond to different counter measures
- Diffusion affected by:
  - Local conditions and potentially measures
  - Geographic and demographic features of various areas
  - Timing in relation to other processes e.g. demobilisation of troops
- All measures likely « porous » to a degree but may have helped « flatten the curve »



# Spatial diffusion in Belgium

Sources: Population records;  
diaries

## Wave I

Coherence to suggest a SW→NE  
or W→E direction

Some mention « German illness »  
! Mortality lower

Recommandations, some school  
closures and bans on gatherings




Figure 3: Carte représentant l'hypothétique propagation de la grippe espagnole en Belgique occupée (Vague 1)

# Spatial diffusion in Belgium


Sources: Population records; diaries

## Wave II

Similar trend in direction

Heavy mortality

Massive movements of troops and civilians





# Belgian specificities in the (study of the) « Spanish » influenza pandemic

In Belgium, diversity of:

- movement
- populations: civilians, troops, evacuees
- spaces (front/operation area; rear area (« zone des étapes »); occupied area)

Challenge of data availability requiring a very granular approach in space and time



*Atlas de la Wallonie, de la préhistoire à nos jours*

# Conclusion

What are the features of the diffusion of « Spanish » influenza in Belgium?

→ existing clues to complexity and heterogeneity

Unique situation of Belgium

Much resources untapped so far



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